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Abstract
The paper examines the implication of International Intellectual Property (IP) laws 
and agreements on the sustainable development of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
and Developed Countries (DCs) and suggests approaches for improving the develop-
ment and wellbeing of people in the developing world through national IP laws. The 
paper argues that generally international IP agreements may appear biased against 
developing countries and most DCs are reluctant to challenge the status quo and/or 
use the flexibilities of the international IP agreement to promote the wellbeing of their 
citizens. However, the article finds that LDCs and DCs could change this trend through 
the creative use of national IP laws and international agreements to promote the sus-
tainable development of LDCs and DCs. The major instrument suggested for this shift 
in approach is the establishment of national IP administration institutions and the 
positive use of compulsory licences.
Keywords
compulsory licences – developing countries – intellectual property – sustainable 
development – TRIPS
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1 Introduction
It is a generally accepted proposition that the development of a country de-
pends largely on the health of the population and their access to modern 
technologies.1 This postulation is backed by evidence showing that when ill-
ness and diseases like AIDS, meningitis, polio and malaria ravage countries, 
their workforce slows down in productivity and the economy becomes sluggish 
throwing the population into further poverty and health risks. Same theory ap-
plies and the problem compounded when such countries lack access to mod-
ern technology to help move them away from poverty or access medication 
to help maintain the health of their human resources. Ironically, for least and 
developing countries where such problems usually arise, policies, agreements 
and laws made by and promoted by developed countries tend to worsen the 
situation instead of resolving it. These laws and agreements are typically biased 
against LDCs and DCs which are already dependent on the developed nations.2 
Examples of such laws are the international and national laws on intellectual 
property, with particular reference to those relating to access to medication 
and information technology. In this paper therefore, we take a look at the im-
plications of international intellectual property (IP) agreements, especially 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement 
and Foreign Trade Agreements (FTAs) on access to medicine and sustainable 
development in developing countries. We go further to suggest approaches de-
veloping countries and the international community could adopt to combat 
the unintended negatives of these laws and international agreements.
Given that the TRIPS Agreement, for WTO member states, appears to be the 
main international legal instrument regulating the use of, and access to in-
tellectual property in the international arena, it has unsurprisingly attracted 
some controversy since its introduction in April 1994. The key provisions of 
TRIPS that affects access to medicine and sustainable development in devel-
oping countries are its extension of patent protection and protection of data 
submitted for the registration of pharmaceutical products.3 These two pro-
visions greatly impede the ability of most developing countries and all least 
1   See generally, Anthony Strittmatter and Uwe Sunde (2011) Health and Economic 
Development: Evidence from the Introduction of Public Health Care. IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 5901, August. Online. Available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5901.pdf (Accessed 8th July 2015).
2   Yu P. K., (2007), “The International Enclosure Movement”, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 82. Iss. 4, 
(827–907) at p. 887 to 888. [Online] Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1373&context=ilj (Accessed 14th June 2014).
3   See generally Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS Agreement.
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developing countries from access to needed medicines or developing generic 
alternatives. For instance, prior to the TRIPS Agreement many countries, de-
veloping and developed, granted patents for periods between 15 to 17 years.4 
Some countries like India granted as low as between 5 and 7 years.5 But since 
after the TRIPS agreement countries have been forced to grant minimum of 
20 years protection, with the potential of some countries being forced through 
FTAs to extend it to 30 years or more. This is not a good development for devel-
oping countries, because it locks them into an imbalanced relationship with 
developed countries and further perpetuates their lack of development. It is 
also in no way a scenario for sustainable development and therefore requires 
that such countries initiate active and positive policies and laws that could 
reverse the trend. The question therefore is whether the supposed reasons for 
the promotion of patent rights outweigh or is against the access to medicines 
and sustainable development of developing countries and if not, how can 
this problem be resolved. To examine this question the remaining part of this 
paper is structured as follows. The next section takes a look at the major argu-
ments for patent protection. This is followed by a discussion of the legality of 
local working requirements and impact of IP on sustainable development of 
developing countries (DCs). Next is a look at how intellectual property agree-
ments (IPAs) are used to perpetuate the underdevelopment of DCs, with ex-
amples of its effects. This is followed by a proposal of how compulsory licences 
could be used to remedy some of these problems. The paper then concludes 
with a summary of the discussion so far, highlights of recommendations and 
contributions.
2 Arguments for International IP Agreements
There are several arguments proffered for International IP Agreements. The 
major arguments are twofold and may seem contradictory. First is the one that 
suggest it is to ensure reward for the hard work and creativity of the inventor. 
Second is that it is to ensure that inventions are judiciously used for the good 
of society. Both of these arguments are discussed below.
4   WHO (2005) “Access to Medicines: Intellectual property protection: impact on public health”, 
WHO Drug Information, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 236–241 at p. 238. [Online]. Available at: http://
www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/AccesstoMedicinesIPP.pdf [Accessed 14th May 2014].
5   Ibid p. 238.
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2.1 Reward for Creativity
The first argument of most advocates of patent protection, especially amongst 
corporate interest and developed countries, is that according to the principle 
of capitalism it is a fair approach at ensuring that creativity is rewarded. It 
is argued that this will encourage more creativity, inspire development and 
hopefully ensure the continued growth and development of mankind.6 The 
other major point of this argument is that companies (especially pharmaceuti-
cal companies) expend huge amounts of money in the research and develop-
ment of products and it is thus justified that they are granted patent protection 
to enable them recover the resources spent on the innovation.7 Proponents of 
this argument contend that without patent protection there will be a prolifera-
tion of copies of products and thereby deprive inventors of the reward for their 
invention. Especially, as the time and money spent on a product or process 
may be lost without accruing any money for further research and development 
of new products or processes.8 In fact while some have gone as far as suggest-
ing that lack of patent protection impedes competition and the price lowering 
benefits such competitions could bring,9 others have been quoted as saying 
that “without patents, the pharmaceutical industry ceases to exist”.10 This argu-
ment appears to be hinged on the supposition that patent right fuels innova-
tion and that the money it brings is put back into funding more innovation.
6    Goldberg, P. K., (2010), “Alfred Marshall Lecture on Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
in Developing Countries: The Case of Pharmaceuticals”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Vol. 8, Iss. 2–3, 326–353 at p. 327. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/ 
jeurec/v8y2010i2-3p326-353.html [Accessed 11th August 2014].
7    Ibid.
8    MacQueen H. L., (2009) Appropriate for the Digital Age, Copyright and the Internet: 
Scope of Copyright in Edwards L., and Waelde C., (eds), Law and the Internet. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing Ltd; p. 183; Geiger C., (2010) The Future of Copyright in Europe: Striking a Fair 
Balance between Protection and Access to Information. Intellectual Property Quarterly 
Vol. 1 p. 3.
9    Watal, J. (2000). Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries: Does the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement Hinder It? Science, Technology and Innovation Discussion Paper No. 8, 
Center for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA., at 
pp. 2–3.
10   Andemariam S. W., (2007), The Cleft-stick Between Anti-Retroviral Drug Patents and 
HIV/AIDS Victims: An In-depth Analysis of the WTO’s TRIPs Article 31 bis Amendment 
Proposal of 6 December 2005. Intellectual Property Quarterly Vol. 4 p. 414–466, A state-
ment by the Chief Executive of GSK Pharmaceuticals, see also “Get Involved: What’s your 
perspective”, Against the Odds (online) Available at: http://apps.nlm.nih.gov/against 
theodds/get_involved/perspective1.html [Accessed 14th August 2014].
Downloaded from Brill.com12/07/2018 11:37:33AM
via University of Central Lancs
 5International Intellectual Property Agreements
African Journal of Legal Studies 9 (2016) 1–19
But a decoupling of the above arguments leads to the recognition of two 
facts i.e. that: (1) innovation is built on existing knowledge and, (2) Society is 
impoverished when restrictions are placed on innovations. In other words, 
innovation may not necessarily be independently original (there are always 
root knowledge from which they are developed) and therefore does not always 
deserve unlimited reward or protection. Also, countries and industries could 
choose to encourage and stimulate innovation through the grant of subsidies, 
research grants and tax incentives. These measures could help avoid the high 
cost of products created by patent monopolies. The presence of alternatives 
like the ones above suggests it is necessary to seek further ways to amend or 
avoid, for want of a better phrase, the unintended consequences of excessive 
patent protection laws and agreements like TRIPS and TRIPS related Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA)/FTA. This perspective appears to support the seeming 
contradicting objective of patent protection, i.e. promotion of social welfare 
and development.
2.2 The Promotion of Social Wellbeing and Sustainable Development
There are arguments that the protection of patent rights ensures that essential 
products and processes are duly exploited for the benefit of society.11 For pro-
ponents of this argument, patents help to reward inventors but the ultimate 
goal is not to maximize profit for inventors but to ensure that inventors release 
their products for the use and benefit of society.12 This accords with the ar-
gument that the primary objective of patents right is to stimulate innovation 
through the transfer and dissemination of technological know-how.13 It is sug-
gested that this is why society through law imposes the limitation of public 
interest in the sale, use and exploitation of patent rights.14 In other words, in-
ventors can exploit their inventions to the extent it does not hinder the fulfil-
ment of public interests. Such limitations, it is argued, is aimed to ensure the 
promotion of social benefits and to cover the cost of the financial benefits given 
to inventors through international agreements and national laws on IP. Such 
11   Abbott, F., (2002) “WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to Medicines 
in Developing Countries” Study Paper 2a: The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
at p. 28.
12   Correa, C., (2007) “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary 
on the TRIPS Agreement (Oxford Commentaries on GATT/WTO Agreements)”, Oxford 
University Press, at p. 91.
13   Ibid, see also Article 7 of TRIPS.
14   Correa, C., (1999) “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: 
Options for Developing Countries”, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity 
Working Paper No. 5, South Centre, at p. 7.
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limitations are usually enforced through instruments like compulsory licences 
which mandate local working, reasonable pricing, e.g. in cases of pharmaceuti-
cal products and processes, in order to promote public health, improve wellbe-
ing, and promote access to technology and sustainable development.15 This is 
because patents are expected to help infuse needed knowledge and stimulus 
to the local talent, which hopefully translates to further inventions, develop-
ments, jobs and social wellbeing and security for the immediate society.
This argument and support for the use of international agreements and na-
tional laws to promote the fair exploitation of patents is particularly true for 
developing and least developed economies. Especially as evidence show that 
developed nations have been successfully operating on the same principle to 
the detriment of LDCs.16 But this is not the case as restrictions imposed by 
international IP agreements on national patents are continually restrictive 
and damaging. They are damaging in the sense they are restricting social and 
economic development of least developed countries (LDCs) and DCs while ex-
panding the financial benefit to patent owners and developed countries. This 
is against the principles of fairness and social responsibility expected from de-
veloped countries, patent owners and multinational corporations. This skewed 
state of affairs is possible because of the economic and political dominance of 
developed economies over LDCs and DCs that is keeping them stagnated at 
different levels of underdevelopment and dependence.17
However, there appear to be a varying degree of carelessness in the promo-
tion of national interest amongst LDCs and DCs. For instance, Ghana, appear 
to be ceding more ground to international IP agreements instead of harmon-
ising and empowering its patent regime.18 This is in spite of evidence of the 
15   Ibid Correa, C., note 9 above and note 11; Stephen Ladas, (1975), “Patents, Trademarks, and 
Related Rights-National and International Protection”, Volume 1, Harvard University Press, 
at p. 536; Lemley, M, Menell, P and Merges, R., (2007) “Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age” (4th Revised Edn), Aspen Law, at p. 13.
16   See generally Yu, P. K., (2007), at note 1 above.
17   Ayodele A. Adewole (2010) “Globalization, the Trips Agreement and Their Implications 
on Access to Essential Medicine for Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria”. 
NIALS Law and Development Journal. Pp. 172–192, at p. 187. (Online). Available at: http://
www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/Ayodele%20A.%20Adewole.pdf [Accessed 8th August 
2014].
18   Cohen J. C. et al (2005) TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and increasing access to medicines: 
policy options for Ghana. Globalization and Health, 1:17, at p. 4, Doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-1-17. 
(Online). Available at: http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17 [Accessed 
7th August 2014].
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unavailability and unaffordability of essential quality medicines in Ghana.19 
Nigeria on the other hand, despite the availability of constitutional provisions 
that make the protection and promotion of life a fundamental responsibility 
of the government, remains stagnant in its patent laws.20 All attempts to im-
prove the patent regime through harmonised patent administration institu-
tion remain stagnant.21 India appears to be the only developing country that 
has actively promoted its public health and the growth of its local economy 
through a harmonised patent administration regime.22 Accordingly, India ap-
pear to be wining the patent monopoly war because of its recognition that the 
undue restrictive nature of international IP agreements can at times be tanta-
mount to breach of fundamental human rights of right to life, education and 
dignity of work.23 Practical instances of how these restrictions have affected 
and continue to affect LDCs and DCs include cases of restriction of access to 
medicines, increase in the digital divide and slowing down of national devel-
opment. Some of these impacts are discussed below.
19   Center for Pharmaceutical Management (2003), Access to Essential Medicines: Ghana. 
Prepared for the Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines Program. Arlington, VA: 
Management Sciences for Health. (Online) Available at: http://apps.who.int/medici 
nedocs/documents/s18071en/s18071en.pdf [Accessed 14th August 2014], at p. 48.
20   Chapter 2 of the Nigerian Constitution provides for right to life of all. The Constitution 
being superior to all statutes, including International IP agreements, its fundamental 
rights provisions could be leveraged to ensure that the human rights provisions are pro-
moted. This is in addition to other provisions in the Patents and Design Act, Chapter 344, 
1990, which provides for instruments like compulsory licences. There is however little 
evidence that Nigeria has fully taken advantage of these provision either to develop its 
economy or provide essential medicines for illnesses like AIDs, Malaria, TB, etc.
21   Nigeria recently introduced a bill aimed at harmonising the patent regime and admin-
istration to the National Assembly, which is yet to be passed into law. It was tagged as 
“A Bill for an Act to provide for the Establishment of the Intellectual Property Commission 
of Nigeria, Repeal of Trademarks Act, Cap. T13, LFN 2004 and Patents and Designs Act, 
Cap. P2, LFN 2004 and Make Comprehensive Provisions for the Registration and Protection 
of Trademarks, Patents and Designs, Plant Varieties, Animal Breeders and Farmers Rights 
and for other Related Matters (Bill for the Establishment of the Nigerian IP Commission)”.
22   India leverages just its Constitutional human rights provisions, e.g. Article 47, and the 
Indian Patent Act 1970 in its administration of patent regulation in India. See also the case 
of Bayer V. Natco below.
23   See the groundbreaking decision in India in Bayer Corporation v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 
Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://
www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm (Accessed 8th August, 2014).
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3 Impact of International IP Agreements on Public Health and 
Sustainable Development of LDCs and DCs
Ordinarily, IP agreements should not constitute significant problems to DCs 
since sovereign states should be able to formulate national IP laws that suit 
their local needs. However, this will be ignoring the fact that DCs are often un-
able to do this due to their obligation under the multilateral legal framework 
to maintain particular standards of IP protection and the immense economic 
and political dominance exercised by developed nations over DCs and LDCs.24 
These obligations often mean that the various international treaties relating 
to IP protection, to which they are signatories, negatively influence their na-
tional IP legislations.25
Such negative influences usually manifests in two major areas which result 
in the deepening of the underdevelopment of LDCs and DCs. The first is in 
the area of expansion of copyright protection, which directly and negatively 
impacts the ability of people in DCs to access information to develop or man-
ufacture products for health, developmental and educational purposes. The 
second is in the area of patent protection and its resultant monopolies, which 
also has a damaging effect on DCs in that it makes it difficult for DCs to be able 
to purchase essential products like cheap generic medicines needed for pro-
moting public health. Both scenarios are discussed further in the next section.
3.1 IP Protection and Access to Information and Educational  
Materials in DCs
The role of information and education in the development of any society, not 
least DCs, can never be over emphasised. Under a logical order of things educa-
tion produces a better and more sophisticated workforce, which in turn leads 
to an increase in the productive capacity of a nation.26 It is therefore safe to 
say that DCs will need to rely on the quality and strength of their manpower in 
24   Ayodele A. Adewole (2010) “Globalization, the Trips Agreement and Their Implications 
on Access to Essential Medicine for Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria”. 
NIALS Law and Development Journal. Pp. 172–192, at p. 187. (Online). Available at: http://
www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/Ayodele%20A.%20Adewole.pdf [Accessed 8th August 
2014].
25   Xue H., (2008) Copyright Exceptions for Online Distance Education, Intellectual Property 
Quarterly, Vol. 2 at p. 214.
26   See generally Jee-Peng Tan, Robert McGough and Alexandria Valerio (2010) Workforce 
Development in Developing Countries: A Framework for Benchmarking. Human 
Development Network World Bank, The World Bank Group, particularly at pp. 1 
to 2, and 27. Online. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/
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order to drive their development. This is why capacity building and manpower 
development are very important to DCs. However lack of access to informa-
tion and knowledge especially in the digital age greatly reduces the ability of 
people in DCs to obtain quality education. In this regard, the current trend 
whereby IP law appears to be contributing to the ever-increasing restriction of 
public access to digital information and knowledge in DCs is a matter of great 
concern.
With regard to access to information and digital resources in DCs, some of 
the provisions of the current multilateral agreements for IP protection, which 
appears to negatively impact DCs, include those relating to protection of origi-
nal databases and legal protection for circumvention of technological mea-
sures. For example, Article 10 (2) of TRIPS and Article 5 of WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (WCT)27 both require contracting parties to provide legal protection of 
original databases in their national IP legislation. Similarly, Article 11 of the 
WCT28 places an obligation on those who ratify the agreement to enact legisla-
tion to deal with those who try to avoid those technological measures, which 
owners of copyright utilise to protect their works. In the same vein, Articles 18 
and 19 of WPPT29 mirror the forgoing provisions of WCT with regard to provi-
sion of adequate legal protection against circumvention of technological mea-
sures adopted by authors and copyright owners in connection with exercise of 
their rights under the treaty.
These provisions have been criticised by commentators in DCs because they 
ignore the potential difficulties that DCs face in seeking to implement such 
provisions in their national legislation and the negative impact such imple-
mentation will have on their education and personnel development. For ex-
ample, legal protection for circumvention of technological measures such as 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems are difficult to implement and re-
quire very sophisticated legal framework. To meet these requirements, LDCs 
Resources/2782001290520949227/WfD_Benchmarking_Framework.pdf (Accessed 8th July 
2015).
27   WIPO Copyright Treaty.
28   WIPO Copyright Treaty; See the argument that compensation must equal social value of 
invention in Trebilcock M. J. and Howse R., (2005) The Regulation of International Trade, 
3rd ed., (New York: Routledge) at p. 398.
29   WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; Developed countries enforce and justify 
these provisions with the disingenuous argument that non-restrictive protection of pat-
ents are damaging on trade when in effect the trade is one-sided and greatly disadvantag-
es LDCs. See Jackson J. H., (1997) The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, (2nd ed.), Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology; at 
p. 311.
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will have to expend large sums of money and other resources (in many 
cases being trained in the patentee country) before they can meet the infra-
structural and human capital standards required of them. Even where they are 
able to implement such measures, it may not also bode well for their overall 
development because by then the world may have moved on with new prod-
ucts developed and new problems to resolve. This inevitably puts LDCs in a 
catching up mode with the goal post being moved whenever they appear to be 
succeeding. This achieves nothing but to frustrate any attempt at achieving a 
sustainable development for their country and a healthy life for their citizens. 
Thus commentators have criticised some of the provisions of the international 
treaties which regulate IPRs protection for the way they tend to over prioritise 
the interest of owners of IPRs to the detriment of the interest of the LDC’s 
public.30
3.2 IP Protection and Access to Essential Medicines in DCs
As noted above, as members of World Trade Organisation (WTO), DCs are 
obliged to take account of WTO treaties in formulating their domestic IP law. 
In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, it created particular difficulties for DCs 
and led to calls for clarification of some of the relevant provisions, especially 
those sections that appeared to make it more difficult for DCs to purchase ge-
neric medicines which they need in order to deal with public health issues in 
their countries. The fall out of these calls was the Doha Declaration.
The main objective of the Doha Declaration was to clarify certain sections of 
the TRIPS Agreement and to affirm the flexibilities inherent in the Agreement. 
It was also a way of resolving the confusion associated with the proper inter-
pretation and implementation of the agreement. The development was essen-
tially necessitated by the need to affirm that the TRIPS Agreement recognises 
the value of balancing the protection of IPRs with that of making essential 
medicines easily accessible to people in DCs who need such medicines to deal 
with their public health needs.31
The TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO members to maintain minimum stan-
dards of IP protection within their respective domains but does not prescribe 
any particular form in which this can be done. Instead, it allows them to de-
cide on the most suitable way of doing this in their respective legal systems. 
However, in spite of this apparent freedom to decide, Articles 30 and 31 limits 
30   See generally Correa C. M., (2007) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31   Correa C. M., (2007) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary 
on the TRIPS Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press; p. 94.
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the flexibility of DCs by limiting their ability to implement instruments that 
could help reduce the price of essential and generic medicines required to 
tackle public health crisis. For instance, although Article 30 allows signatory 
countries to reduce the damaging effect of the exclusive right of a patent hold-
er some clauses makes this possible only in exceptional circumstances.
Also, Article 31 allows member states, through compulsory licences, to per-
mit other use of a patented product without seeking the permission of the 
original owner of the work. However, this permission is subject to subsections 
‘a’ to ‘f ’ of Article 31. For instance, the condition stipulated in Article 31(f) is 
that compulsory licences can only be issued to enable products to be manufac-
tured for predominantly local consumption. In other words the licencee must 
produce the product within the country issuing the licence and not in a third 
party country. Strictly speaking, this limited interpretation of Article 31(f) may 
seem the appropriate position especially, as the absence of local manufactur-
ing is usually the ground for granting compulsory licences in DCs.32 This is the 
line taken and supported by most developed countries and the international 
pharmaceutical industry.33 However, the legality, social and human benefit of 
this interpretation is vigorously questioned by many scholars and health ac-
tivities, especially in relation to medicine. The argument is that although local 
working is a legitimate ground for granting, waiting for the establishment of 
local manufacturing base may impede and defeat the objective of the licence, 
especially in emergency cases like epidemics. In such cases it is advocated that 
the licence be granted to a third party who can manufacture in another coun-
try and supply the country of need.34 This is the present position for most DC. 
However, there is yet to be established a generally accepted legal precedent for 
this position especially by most developing countries like the USA.
In other words, for developed countries, the position remains that those 
countries like India who have the local manufacturing capacity cannot invoke 
32   See Murthy, Divya (2002) “The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.” American University 
International Law Review 17, No. 6, pp. 1299–1346.
33   Amir Attaran (2002) The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal 859 to 885 at p. 862.
34   This interpretation recognises and promotes the original basis of such grant which was 
to protect and promote national self-interest. In other words, if working in a neighbour-
ing country could solve the immediate problem of the grantor state, TRIPs should not be 
interpreted to negate such objective. See Paul Champ and Amir Attaran (2002) Patent 
Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S. – 
Brazil Patent Dispute. The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 27: 365, at pp. 370–373.
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this provision when producing generic medicines for use in other least devel-
oped countries. This situation has a negative implication on LDCs and DCs 
because it means that DCs which can manufacture generic medicines locally 
cannot export such medicines to other DCs that do not have such local manu-
facturing capacity. This is irrespective of whether such countries desperately 
need such generic medicines to tackle public health problems or whether they 
are sold at very affordable prices to a least developed country for a legitimate 
purpose.
The above situation has been recognised as a serious impediment for DCs 
in their efforts to access affordable essential medicines which they need to 
fight diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.35 Accordingly, to rem-
edy this situation, the General Council adopted a recommendation of the 
TRIPS Council to temporarily waive the obligations of Article 31(f) so as to 
enable DCs that are WTO members and have the capacity to manufacture ge-
neric medicines to export same to those DCs who do not have such capacity. 
Emerging evidence however, suggest a new impediment, which also affects the 
development of DCs as far as IP protection is concerned. This is the disingenu-
ous use of TRIPS flexibilities to limit compulsory licences by imposing stricter 
IP agreements in bilateral trade agreements between DCs and developed 
countries. The next section examines this impediment.
4 Trips-Plus Provisions and FTAs that Impede Sustainable 
Development of DCs
The inclusion of what is now widely referred to as TRIPS-plus clauses or pro-
visions in bilateral or free trade agreements (BTAs/FTAs) between DCs and 
developed countries, is another way patentees through their home countries 
(usually developed countries), circumvent TRIPS intentions. They bully coun-
tries into imposing more restrictive IP laws. For purposes of clarity ‘TRIPS-
plus’ clauses refer to clauses inserted in BTAs and FTAs between developed 
countries and DCs which require DCs to maintain higher levels of IP protection 
than those required of them under the TRIPS Agreement. Article 1.1 of TRIPS 
appears to be the enabling provision for this phenomenon. This is because 
35   AFRICAN UNION (2013) Declaration of the Special Summit of African Union on HIV/
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria “Abuja Actions toward the Elimination of HIV and AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in Africa by 2030” Abuja, Nigeria, 16 July.at p.4. Online. Available 
at: http://sa.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2013%20Abuja%20Declaration.pdf (Accessed 
8th July 2015).
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it allows WTO members flexibility to either increase or decrease the level of 
IP protection granted to patentees. Evidence however, shows that developed 
countries are only using this flexibility to impose higher levels of IP protec-
tions on DCs in order to avoid use of compulsory licences and to maintain 
monopoly.
The USA, EU and Japan appear to be foremost in taking advantage of these 
flexibilities by inserting stricter restrictive IP clauses in their BTAs with DCs. 
A recent example is an FTA between the USA and Singapore that used a TRIPS-
plus flexibility to impose a higher IP protection on patents in Singapore.36 
Thailand and Chile also suffered a similar fate when the US used the flexibili-
ties to demand greater access for its exports and preferential treatment for US 
IPRs holders.37 The European Union (EU) has also used similar tactics through 
its use of the EU Regulation 1383, which demands higher IPRs protection from 
certain countries particularly with respect to border enforcement.38 In other 
words, the Doha Declaration appear to have been tailored to allow flexibilities 
in the TRIPS Agreement which developed countries can legitimately use to 
support their actions, through instruments like BTAs/FTAs.39
These TRIPS-plus provisions in BTAs are accordingly major problems for 
DCs because while it grants monopolies to developed countries it does not 
allow DCs to adopt sustainable IP protection measures. Example of this is the 
way such IP rights hinder the availability and affordability of cheap generic 
medicines for public health needs. In particular, such provisions negatively im-
pact DCs in the following ways:
36   See generally, Kang, P. H., and Stone, C. S., (2003) IP, Trade, and U.S./Singapore Relations – 
Significant Intellectual Property Provisions of the 2003 U.S.–Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, Journal of World Intellectual Property. [Online] Available at: http://online 
library.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2003.tb00238.x/asset/j.1747-1796.2003.tb00238 
.x.pdf?v=1&t=hyu22sev&s=d419beaf9265066c9520c626ab5d526f9fc29bdd [Accessed 14th 
August 2014].
37   See generally, Roffe P., (2004) Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The Chile-
USA Free Trade Agreement, Quaker International, Ottawa. See particularly pp. 5, 8, and 
9, [Online] Available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Intellectual_Property/
IP_and_other_Topics/Chile-USAFTAP.Roffe.pdf [Accessed 14th August 2014].
38   See generally, Kumar S. P., (2009) European Border Measures and Trade in Generic 
Pharmaceuticals: Issues of TRIPS, Doha Declaration and Public Health. International 
Trade Law and Regulation Vol. 15 (6) pp. 176–184, [Online] Available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515224 [Accessed 14th August 2014].
39   Ibid also see Endeshaw A., (2006), Free Trade Agreements as Surrogates for TRIPS-plus. 
European Intellectual Property Review Vol. 28 (7) pp. 374–380.
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4.1 High Cost of Essential Products like Medicines
TRIPS-plus provisions are very expensive for DCs. This is because they usu-
ally require DCs to maintain high levels of IP regimes. Maintaining such high 
regime is very expensive, as it means that the DC concerned has to develop its 
weak legal and enforcement systems. This requires the channelling of huge 
financial and human resources into the development of these weak (usually 
peripheral) infrastructures instead of using them to manufacture or develop 
essential products like medicines. The result is the increase in the cost of doing 
business with the developed countries in two more ways while acutely impov-
erishing the LDCs. The first way is that, these LDCs are forced to recruit con-
sultants from the developed countries to help bring up their infrastructure to 
the levels demanded by developed countries. The second way is that imposi-
tions of IP agreements have been shown to invariably increase the cost of re-
lated products or in some cases restrict any possibility of fall in cost due to the 
monopoly it creates. Usual examples are pharmaceutical companies. This has 
negative effect on LDCs as the product, e.g. medicines become very expensive 
and available only to the very rich, thus contributing to making the develop-
ment of DCs both sluggish and very expensive.40
4.2 Excessive Delay in Availability of Essential Products
TRIPS-plus provisions in BTAs also negatively impact DCs because of the delay 
it creates in the introduction of new essential medicines into the market. 
This phenomenon is usually forced on LDCs through data exclusivity clauses 
between developed nations and LDCs. Although the EU appears to current-
ly comply with Article 39(3) of TRIPS,41 which should curtail this problem, 
the USA is yet to relent in its use of exclusivity clauses in BTAs/FTAs, with 
DCs.42 The USA, have been leveraging its political and economic dominance 
to pressure the DCs to agree to the inclusion of these clauses, although it is 
evident they are unfavourable to development of DCs. These include clauses 
on exclusivity/prohibition of use of original research data for products like 
40   Fink C., and Reichenmiller P., (2005), Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property 
Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements. World Bank Trade Note No. 20. 
Pp. 289–303., at pp. 290–291 [Online]. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/24.TighteningTRIPS.pdf [Accessed 
14th August 2014].
41   Ibid, note 30 above. Also see O’Farrell G., (2008) One Small Step or One Giant Leap to-
wards Access to Medicine for All? European Intellectual Property Review Vol. 30 (6) pp. 211–
215 at p. 213;
42   Ibid O’Farrell at p. 214.
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medicines.43 The effect is that manufacturers of generic medicines in DCs are 
forced to wait, for upwards of 5, 10 to 20 years, for the expiration of patents be-
fore using such data to support their manufacture of generic medicines.
This means that the introduction of new generic medicines is delayed and 
this in turn results to an increase in the prices of available alternative generic 
medicines because demand for such medicines especially in DCs becomes 
greater than their supply. The overall implication of this is that while the delay 
lasts, thousands of lives are lost due to the inability of their governments to ac-
cess cheap essential medicines. This is a public health issue for DCs. As some 
authors have argued, it is fundamentally wrong to suggest that only patented 
medicines with exclusivity restrictions should be used to deal with health cri-
sis in emerging economies.44
4.3 Lack of Transparency
TRIPS-plus provisions in FTA and BTAs generally tend to undermine one of the 
most basic protections afforded by the multilateral framework. Multilateral 
agreements should increase transparency and a level playing field but BTAs do 
not guarantee these because of the differences in the bargaining power of the 
parties involved.45 Often DCs agree to the inclusion of these provisions in their 
BTAs with developed countries out of desperation and fear developed coun-
tries will deny them other privileges if they do not go along with these provi-
sions. It is not usually because they like it or believe that any benefits will come 
from it. In other words, the mechanism of BTAs basically allows the stronger 
party to arm-twist the weaker party into agreeing to provisions, which may not 
benefit them. For example Art. 10.1.2 of the US-Chile FTA permits parties to 
the agreement to adopt a dispute settlement mechanism that is different from 
the one provided by the WTO framework.46 This trend have been criticised be-
cause it does not guarantee transparency and public access, which invariably 
43   Ibid O’Farrell pp.213–214.
44   Abbott F. M., (2002), “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: 
Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO” Journal of International Economic Law. Vol. 5 (2), 22. 
Pp. 469–505 at pp. 5 and 14. [Online]. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1493725 [Accessed 14th August].
45   Some may however argue that multilateral agreements are also skewed against LDCs and 
DCs, but this imbalance is far less than what is exists when only two unequal economies 
are involved.
46   Lin T., (2009) Compulsory Licenses for Access to medicines, Expropriation and Investor-
State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Agreements – Are there Issues beyond the 
TRIPS Agreement? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
Vol. 40 (2) pp. 152–173.
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equates to an unfair adjudicatory system.47 In other words, a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that is lacking in transparency and public access can hardly 
guarantee fairness and justice. In this scenario, the LDCs and DCs are always 
on the disadvantaged end.
4.4 Impeding Sustainable Development of DCs by Restricting Transfer  
of Technology and Development
TRIPS-plus provisions in BTAs/FTAs between DCs and developed coun-
tries also negatively impact DCs because of the way it hinders the transfer 
of technology to indigenous firms and thereby hinder them from improving 
their local manufacturing capacity. Because of the various restrictions which 
TRIPS-plus provisions place on these indigenous companies they are not able 
to fully engage in the development of the technology or learn from existing 
ones. Often as compensation for this, developed countries tend to promise DCs 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in exchange for maintaining these 
high IP standards but in reality there is no evidence of a link between higher 
IP protection standards and increased FDI especially as it relates to the issue 
of technology transfer.
5 Resolving the IP and Social Welfare Conundrum
The above problems are not insurmountable. There are already clauses in 
the TRIPS agreement and in many national patent laws48 that seek to resolve 
these seeming conflicts or what sometimes amount to the abuse of patent and 
FT/BT agreements. The intent of this paper therefore is to provide rationale 
for LDCs and the developed nations, to question the immediate gratification, 
which these FTAs appear to offer, and realise that in most cases such gratifi-
cations are far less beneficial and creates an inequitable society than what a 
more responsible and sustainable patent agreement can offer. In other words 
a more responsible and sustainable IP agreement has a better potential at im-
proving, in the long term, a country’s social wellbeing, safeguarding the public 
health, improving education and encouraging economic growth, development 
and trade, than any restrictive patent agreement entered in exchange of trade 
agreement may achieve. Accordingly this paper posits that the creative use 
of compulsory licences and in extreme cases, parallel importation could help 
47   Ibid.
48   Unfortunately most LDC and DC including Nigeria lack streamlined patent administra-
tion institutions like the one available in India.
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resolve the above problems.49 Compulsory licenses could be used to achieve 
two major requirements, i.e. ensuring reasonable affordability of products 
and ensuring local working of patents.50 On the other hand, patentees could 
meet these requirements if they wish to avoid local compulsory licences or 
parallel importations. Parallel importation is however only advocated here as 
a temporary measure for countries that lack the technical base to develop or 
manufacture essential products, especially medicines even through compul-
sory licences, or for short-term resolution of emergencies like epidemics.
The affordability requirement for the implementation of compulsory li-
cences should be determined not by the price of the product in the patentees’ 
home country or by that set by the patentee company but on what citizens 
of the recipient country can afford. The premise of patents is to make prod-
ucts legally available for the public to purchase and use. Setting the price of 
such products, especially medicines at highly unaffordable prices defeat the 
availability objective and negate the social welfare justification for the grant 
of patents. This approach is especially necessary in LDCs because in most 
cases citizens of DCs and LDCs cannot afford the product at prevailing inflated 
prices.51 More importantly, arguments about the high cost of Research and 
Development (R&D) should not hold because in most cases, such companies 
would have recouped a greater percentage if not all the cost of development of 
the product (which many pharmaceutical companies inflate with cost of clini-
cal trials) before venturing into LDCs.52 Also evidence suggests that most R&D 
49   Some authors, with regards to medicines, have suggested other measures like pooled/
bulk procurement. As attractive as these measures may seem, being temporary measures, 
depending on them has a higher potential of worsening the situation in LDCs than re-
solving them. This is apart from the administrative complexities involved and the fact 
that LDCs are still forced to play by the rules of the developed countries. See Ayodele A. 
Adewole (2010) note 8 above and Cohen J. C. et al (2005) TRIPS, the Doha Declaration 
and increasing access to medicines: policy options for Ghana. Globalization and Health, 
1:17 doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-1-17. (Online). Available at: http://www.globalizationandhealth 
.com/content/1/1/17 [Accessed 7th August 2014].
50   Yosick, J., (2001), “Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions”, University 
of Illinois Law Review 5, pp. 1275–1304 at p. 1290.
51   Baker, B., (2004) Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: An Analysis of WTO 
Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, 14 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review. 613, at p. 1.
52   DiMasi J., Hansen, R. and Grabowski, H. (2003) “ The Price of Innovation: New Estimates 
of Drug Development Costs” Journal of Health Economics 22, (151–85) at p. 180. Available 
at: http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/twiki/pub/LawNetSoc/BahradSokhansanjFirstPaper
/22JHealthEcon151_drug_development_costs_2003.pdf (Accessed April 2014).
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cost is highly inflated in other to justify high cost, especially in the pharmaceu-
tical industry.53 In other words, any price setting must take into consideration 
the economic power of the grantee country and not just that of the patentee.54
The local working requirement (with transitional adjustments to accommo-
date emergency circumstances55) is another element that should be fiercely 
promoted and protected by LDCs. This is important because it fulfils many 
goals for a poor country. For instance in the case of medicines, it provides the 
country with medicines at affordable prices, help provide jobs to its citizens, 
inspire further development of new and local technology and improves the 
countries’ economic outlook. This is achieved when either a foreign patentee 
company chooses to produce within the country and at affordable prices or 
the country grants compulsory licence to another or local company which can 
achieve the same objectives. This is necessary because, in many cases, foreign 
companies refuse to produce the products locally, especially medicines, in 
other to justify high prices. As has already been stated earlier, this creates and 
perpetuates many problems for the grantor countries. These include forcing 
prices to remain high, slowing technological growth, development, and deep-
ening unemployment while the country’s meagre financial resources is fun-
nelled outside to purchase products like medicines at inflated prices.
6 Conclusion
International Intellectual Property protection and exploitation is a phenom-
enon that has come to stay and should not be removed. It has its very impor-
tant contributions to society. As demonstrated earlier the main ones are the 
reward for creativity and improving the exploitation of talent for sustainable 
social and economic development. These are benefits which society deserve 
and therefore should be promoted. However, we should not sacrifice one just 
to promote the other, especially when the other is the growth and develop-
53   Ibid; also generally see Marcia A., (2004) “The Truth About the Drug Companies”. The 
New York Review of Books. (Online) Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
archives/2004/jul/15/the-truth-about-the-drug-companies/ (Accessed April 2014).
54   See Article 7 of the TRIPS agreement: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”, Also see Penrose E. T., (1951) The 
Economics of the International Patent System. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press at p. 116.
55   See paragraph 3.2 above.
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ment of the entire humankind, to which the inventors and owners of patent 
belong. This is an option which inventors, patent owners and WTO countries 
should take seriously. One of the ways this goal should be maintained is the 
sustenance of instruments like compulsory licences.
As shown above when this is not done, society, especially the poorer sec-
tion of the global society suffers unimaginable and preventable hardships, 
with seeds of discord and conflicts sown, and the world turned into an in-
cubator of deadly diseases and illness which eventually catches up with the 
strong, the rich, the weak and the poor.56 Society is better off when systems, 
policies and laws are fairer, healthier and just. A fair, just and sustainable set of 
IP agreements and laws is a building block to achieving such a society. All that 
is needed, as demonstrated in the previous sections, is a show of political will, 
creativity and resilience. This is what this paper advocates. It contributes to 
exposing the hardships that restrictive IP regimes creates and opens a window 
to a far better and fairer IP regime that enhances a sustainable social economic 
development for all. A goal fully enshrined and demanded of all governments 
in all human rights laws and international human rights conventions.57 All 
that is left is for DCs and LDCs to be courageous in crafting IP laws that opens 
opportunities for its citizens and ensures their growth and development. 
56   The spread of diseases like Ebola and HIV/AIDs demonstrates this fact.
57   See for example the Nigerian Constitution: Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (CFRN), 1999, section, 33; Article 11(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
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